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A sound interpretation of Les´niewski’s
epsilon in modal logic KTB
Takao Inoue´
Abstract
In this paper, we shall show that the following translation IM from
the propositional fragment L1 of Les´niewski’s ontology to modal logic
KTB is sound: for any formula φ and ψ of L1, it is defined as
(M1) IM (φ ∨ ψ) = IM (φ) ∨ IM (ψ),
(M2) IM (¬φ) = ¬IM (φ),
(M3) IM (ǫab) = ♦pa ⊃ pa. ∧ .pa ⊃ pb. ∧ .♦pb ⊃ pa,
where pa and pb are propositional variables corresponding to the name
variables a and b, respectively. We shall give some comments including
some open problems and my conjectures.
Keywords: Les´niewski’s ontology, propositional ontology, translation, interpreta-
tion, modal logic, KTB, soundness.
1 Introduction and IM
In Inoue´ [13], a partial interpretation of Les´niewski’s epsion ǫ in the modal
logic K and its certain extensions was proposed: that is, Ishimoto’s propo-
sitional fragment L1 (Ishimoto [16]) of Les´niewski’s ontology L (refer to
Urbaniak [23]) is partially embedded in K and in the extensions, respec-
tively, by the following translation I from L1 to them: for any formula φ
and ψ of L1, it is defined as
(I1) I(φ ∨ ψ) = I(φ) ∨ I(ψ),
(I2) I(¬φ) = ¬I(φ),
(I3) I(ǫab) = pa ∧(pa ≡ pb),
where pa and pb are propositional variables corresponding to the name vari-
ables a and b, respectively. Here, “L1 is partially embedded in K by I”
means that for any formula φ of a certain decidable nonempty set of formu-
las of L1 (i.e. decent formulas (see §3 of Inoue´ [14])), φ is a theorem of L1
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if and only if I(φ) is a theorem of K. Note that I is sound. The paper [14]
also proposed similar interpretations of Les´niewski’s epsilon in certain von
Wright-type deontic logics, that is, ten Smiley-Hanson systems of monadic
deontic logic and in provability logic GL, respectively. (See A˚qvist [1] and
Boolos [3] for those logics.)
The interpretation I is however not faithful. A counterexample for the
faithfulness is, for example, ǫac ∧ ǫbc. ⊃ .ǫab ∨ ǫcc (for the details, see [14]).
Blass [2] gave a modification of the interpretation and showed that his inter-
pretation T is faithful, using Kripke models. Inoue´ [15] called the translation
Blass translation (for short, B-translation) or Blass interpretation (for short,
B-interpretation). The translation B from L1 to K is defined as follows: for
any formula φ and ψ of L1,
(B1) B(φ ∨ ψ) = B(φ) ∨B(ψ),
(B2) B(¬φ) = ¬B(φ),
(B3) B(ǫab) = pa ∧(pa ⊃ pb) ∧ .pb ⊃ (pb ⊃ pa),
where pa and pb are propositional variables corresponding to the name vari-
ables a and b, respectively. Inoue´ [15] extended Blass’s faithfulness result
for many normal modal logics, provability logic and von Wright-type dentic
logics including K4, KD, KB, KD4, etc, GL and ten Smiley-Hanson sys-
tems of monadic deontic logic, using model constructions based on Hintikka
formula.
In this paper, we first propose a translation IM from L1 in modal logic
KTB, which will be specified in §2.
Definition 1.1 A translation IM of Les´niewski’s propositional ontology L1
in modal logic KTB is defined as follows: for any formula φ and ψ of L1,
(M1) IM (φ ∨ ψ) = IM (φ) ∨ IM (ψ),
(M2) IM (¬φ) = ¬IM (φ),
(M3) IM (ǫab) = ♦pa ⊃ pa. ∧ .pa ⊃ pb. ∧ .♦pb ⊃ pa,
where pa and pb are propositional variables corresponding to the name vari-
ables a and b, respectively.
We call IM to be M-translation or M-interpretation.
In the following §2, we shall collect the basic preliminaries for this paper.
In §3, using proof theory, we shall show that IM is sound, as the main
theorem of this paper. In S4, we shall give some comments including some
open problems and my conjectures.
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2 Propositional ontology L1 and modal logic KTB
Let us recall a formulation of L1, which was introduced in [16]. The Hilbert-
style system of it, denoted again by L1, consists of the following axiom-
schemata with a formulation of classical propositional logic CP as its ax-
iomatic basis:
(Ax1) ǫab ⊃ ǫaa,
(Ax2) ǫab ∧ ǫbc. ⊃ ǫac,
(Ax3) ǫab ∧ ǫbc. ⊃ ǫba,
where we note that every atomic formula of L1 is of the form ǫab for some
name variables a and b and a possible intuitive interpretation of ǫab is ‘the
a is b’. We note that (Ax1), (Ax2) and (Ax3) are theorems of Les´niewski’s
ontology (see S lupecki [21]).
The modal logic K is the smallest logic which contains all instances
of classical tautology and all formulas of the forms (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ .φ ⊃
ψ being closed under modus ponens and the rule of necessitation (for
K and basics for modal logic, see Bull and Segerberg [4], Chagrov and
Zakharyaschev [5], Fitting [6], Hughes and Cresswell [11] and so on).
We recall the naming of modal logics as follows (refer to e.g. Poggiolesi
[20] and Ono [19], also see Bull and Segerberg [4]):
KT: K + φ ⊃ φ (T, reflexive relation)
KB: K + φ ⊃ ♦φ (B, symmetric relation)
KTB: KT + B (reflexive and symmetric relation).
3 The soundness of IM
Theorem 3.1 (Soundness) For any formula φ of L1, we have
⊢L1 φ ⇒ ⊢KTB I
M (φ).
Proof. Let φ be a formula of L1. We shall prove the meta-implication by
induction on derivation.
Basis.
(Case 1) We shall first treat the case for (Ax1). Let a and b be name
variables. Then we have the following inferences in KTB:
(∗) IM (ǫab) (Assumption)
(1.1) ♦pa ⊃ pa from (∗) and Definition 1.1) †
(1.2) pa ⊃ pa (true in K) †
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(1.3) ♦pa ⊃ pa. ∧ .pa ⊃ pa. ∧ .♦pa ⊃ pa (from (1.1) and (1.2))
(1.4) IM (ǫaa) (from (1.3) and Definition 1.1)
(1.5) IM (ǫab ⊃ ǫaa) (from (∗), (1.4) and Definition 1.1).
(Case 2) Next we shall deal with the case of (Ax2). Let a, b and c be name
variables. Then we have the following inferences in KTB:
(∗∗) IM (ǫab ∧ ǫbc) (Assumption)
(2.1) IM (ǫab) (from (∗∗) and Definition 1.1)
(2.2) IM (ǫbc) (from (∗∗) and Definition 1.1)
(2.3) ♦pa ⊃ pa. ∧ .pa ⊃ pb. ∧ .♦pb ⊃ pa (from (2.1) and Def 1.1)
(2.4) ♦pb ⊃ pb. ∧ .pb ⊃ pc. ∧ .♦pc ⊃ pb (from (2.2) and Def 1.1)
(2.5) ♦pa ⊃ pa (from (2.3)) †
(2.6) pa ⊃ pb (from (2.3))
(2.7) pb ⊃ pc (from (2.4))
(2.8) pa ⊃ pc (from (2.6) and (2.7)) †
(2.9) ♦pb ⊃ pa (from (2.3))
(2.10) (♦pb ⊃ pa) (from (2.9) and the rule of necessitation)
(2.11) ♦pb ⊃ pa (from (2.10) with a true inference in K)
(2.12) pa ⊃ pa (true in KT)
(2.13) ♦pb ⊃ pa (from (2.11) and (2.12))
(2.14) pb ⊃ ♦pb (true in KB)
(2.15) ♦pc ⊃ pb (from (2.4))
(2.16) ♦pc ⊃ pa (from (2.13) and (2.14) and (2.15)) †
(2.17) ♦pa ⊃ pa.∧ .pa ⊃ pc.∧ .♦pc ⊃ pa (from (2.5), (2.8) and (2.16))
(2.18) IM (ǫac) (from (2.17) and Definition 1.1)
(2.19) IM (ǫab ∧ ǫbc. ⊃ ǫac) (from (∗∗), (2.18) and Definition 1.1).
(Case 3) Lastly we shall proceed to the case of (Ax3). Let a, b and c be
name variables. Then we also have the following inferences in KTB:
(∗ ∗ ∗) IM (ǫab ∧ ǫbc) (Assumption)
(3.1) IM (ǫab) (from (∗ ∗ ∗) and Definition 1.1)
(3.2) IM (ǫbc) (from (∗ ∗ ∗) and Definition 1.1)
(3.3) ♦pa ⊃ pa. ∧ .pa ⊃ pb. ∧ .♦pb ⊃ pa (from (3.1) and Def 1.1)
(3.4) ♦pb ⊃ pb. ∧ .pb ⊃ pc. ∧ .♦pc ⊃ pb (from (3.2) and Def 1.1)
(3.5) ♦pb ⊃ pb (from (3.4)) †
(3.6) ♦pb ⊃ pa (from (3.3))
(3.7) (♦pb ⊃ pa) (from (3.6) and the rule of necessitation)
(3.8) ♦pb ⊃ pa (from (3.7) with a true inference in K)
(3.9) pb ⊃ ♦pb (true in KB)
(3.10) pb ⊃ pb (true in KT)
(3.11) pb ⊃ pa (from (3.8) and (3.9) and (3.10)) †
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(3.12) ♦pa ⊃ pa (from (3.3))
(3.13) pa ⊃ ♦pa (true in KB)
(3.14) ♦pa ⊃ ♦pa (from (3.12) and (3.13))
(3.15) (♦pa ⊃ pa) (from (3.12) and the rule of necessitation)
(3.16) ♦pa ⊃ pa (from (3.15) with a true inference in K)
(3.17) ♦pa ⊃ pa (from (3.14) and (3.16))
(3.18) pa ⊃ pb (from (3.3))
(3.19) ♦pa ⊃ pb (from (3.17) and (3.18))
(3.20) pb ⊃ pb (true in KT)
(3.21) ♦pa ⊃ pb (from (3.19) and (3.20)) †
(3.22) ♦pb ⊃ pb. ∧ .pb ⊃ pa. ∧ .♦pa ⊃ pb
(from (3.5), (3.11) and (3.21))
(3.23) IM (ǫba) (from (3.22) and Definition 1.1)
(3.24) IM (ǫab ∧ ǫbc. ⊃ ǫba) (from (∗ ∗ ∗), (3.23) and Definition 1.1).
Induction Steps. The induction step is easily dealt with. Suppose that
φ and φ ⊃ ψ are theorems of L1. By induction hypthesis, I
M (φ) and
IM (φ ⊃ ψ) (↔ IM (φ) ⊃ IM (ψ)) are theorems of KTB. By modus ponens,
we obtain ⊢KTB I
M (ψ). Thus this completes the proof the theorem. 
4 Comments
One motive from which I wrote [13] and [14] is that I wished to understand
Les´niewski’s epsilon ǫ on the basis of my recognition that Les´niewski’s ep-
silon would be a variant of truth-functional equivalence ≡. Namely, my
original approach to the interpretation of ǫ was to express the deflection of
ǫ from ≡ in terms of Kripke models. Other (hidden) motives of mine for
IM is to interpret L1 in intuitionistic logic and bi-modal logic. It is well-
known that Les´niewski’s epsilon can be interpreted by the Russellian-type
definite description in classical first-order predicate logic with equality (see
[16]). Takano [22] proposed a natural set-theoretic interpretation for the
epsilon. I repeat to mention that I do not deny the interpretation using the
Russellian-type definite description and a set-theoretic one. I wish to obtain
another interpretation of Les´niewski’s epsilon having a more propositional
character. We have the following direct open problems.
Open problem 1: Is IM faithful?
Open problem 2: Find the set of other translations and modal logics
in which L1 is embedded. I think that there seems to be many possibilities.
Open problem 3: Can L1 be embedded in S4.2? (See e.g. Hamkins
and Lo¨we [9].)
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My conjectures are the following.
Conjecture 1: IM is faithful.
Conjecture 2: It seems that L1 can not be embedded in intuitionistic
propositional logic.
Conjecture 3: It seems that L1 can well be embedded in intuitionistic
modal propositional logic.
Conjecture 4: L1 is embedded in some bi-modal logics.
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